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Comments
Separation of Powers in Pennsylvania: The
Judiciary's Prevention of Legislative Encroachment
"Of the three powers above mentioned the JUDICIARY is next to
nothing."'
INTRODUCTION
Each state constitution contains a separation of powers doctrine.
The general purpose of this doctrine is to prevent one branch of
the government from becoming a tyrant over the other branches.
Under the separation of powers doctrine, the most significant
power of the judicial branch is the interpretation of laws enacted
by the legislative branch. Also, in a majority of the states, includ-
ing Pennsylvania, the judicial branch has been granted general su-
pervisory power of the court systems. However, most jurisdictions
permit the legislative branch to pass laws that affect aspects of the
judicial branch if the statute does not conflict with a court rule or
if the statute does not interfere with the administration of justice.2
1. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS, VOLUME I, 186.
2. See, e.g., Price v. Superior Court, 186 Cal.3d 156 (Cal. 1986) (holding that the
separation of powers doctrine is not offended by a statute permitting the executive branch
to appoint and compensate court employees); Gallegos v. Phipps, 779 P.2d 856 (Colo. 1989)
(holding that the legislature had the power to modify or abrogate decisions by the court so
long as legislation is constitutional); People v. Williams, 529 N.E.2d 558 (111. 1988) (noting
that the legislature may enact statutes complementing authority of judiciary); Forti v. New
York State Ethics Comm'n, 554 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act, that banned former executive department employees from appearing or practic-
ing before their former agencies in connection with a matter in which they directly partici-
pated during their state tenure, did not violate the separation of powers doctrine); State ex.
rel. Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 454 N.W.2d 770 (Wis. 1990) (noting that the legislature
may establish certain standards in order to become eligible to practice law).
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Pennsylvania is an exception to this general rule in that its separa-
tion of powers doctrine prohibits the legislative branch from enact-
ing any law that affects the judicial branch. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, therefore, has emerged as a very powerful branch of
the state government. This separation of powers doctrine has not
always been interpreted or applied this way. This comment de-
scribes the distinct development and application of the separation
of powers doctrine in Pennsylvania that has resulted in an unusu-
ally powerful judicial branch.
BACKGROUND OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE IN
PENNSYLVANIA
The separation of governmental powers into the legislative, exec-
utive, and judicial departments has been inherent in the structure
of Pennsylvania's government since its inception. The convention
of 1776 included this doctrine in the Plan or Form of Govern-
ment.3 The separation of powers doctrine was continued in Penn-
sylvania's Constitutions of 1790, 1838, and 1873." Specifically, the
judicial branch's power was protected by article V, section 1 of the
constitution which provided that "the judicial power of the Com-
monwealth [is] vested in a Supreme Court, in County Courts of
Common Pleas, Oyer and Terminer, and Quarter Sessions, in a
Register's Court, and an Orphans' Court: and in such other courts
as the legislature may from time to time establish."'
Early in its history, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania con-
fronted issues concerning the encroachment of the legislature into
the powers of the judicial branch. Under these circumstances, the
supreme court began to establish principles to interpret the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine under article V. For example, in Green-
ough v. Greenough,6 the state supreme court noted that under the
3. In re Investigation by Dauphin County Grand Jury, September, 1938, 2 A.2d 804,
807 (Pa. 1938).
4. Dauphin County Grand Jury, 2 A.2d at 807.
5. PA. CONST. of 1874 art. V, § 1.
6. 11 Pa. (1 Jones) 489 (1849). In Greenough, the plaintiff brought an action of
ejectment against the defendant. Greenough, 11 Pa. at 489. The plaintiff and defendant
were brothers who were disputing their sister's will. Id. at 489-90. Apparently, the plaintiff
concluded that the will was not signed by his sister; instead, he argued that she marked it
and allowed another person to sign for her making it invalid. Id. at 489-91. The jury re-
turned a verdict for the defendant. Id. at 491. On appeal, the court concluded that the will
was not valid according to the Act of 1833 relating to wills, but the will was valid under the
supplementary Act of 1848. Id. The court held that because the Act of 1848 had retroactive
effect, the defendant was nonetheless entitled to a verdict in his favor. Id. at 495.
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separation of powers doctrine, the legislature's function was to en-
act laws; the judiciary's role was to interpret the laws; and the ex-
ecutive was entrusted to execute the laws." The court based its in-
terpretation on the separation of powers doctrine found in article
V, section 1.8 The court concluded that the inherent powers of the
judicial branch were distributed by the Pennsylvania Constitution
in such a way that the legislature could not exercise any judicial
power.9 In applying these principles, the court in this case declared
a law passed by the legislature unconstitutional because it had the
effect of overruling prior decisions of the court.10 The court rea-
soned that determining a judgment of a case was within the inher-
ent power of the judiciary."
Following Greenough, the supreme court in Commonwealth ex.
rel. Johnson v. Halloway2 declared that an act which provided for
a gradual reduction in a person's prison term based on good behav-
ior was a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, and there-
fore, unconstitutional. s The court noted that the "whole" judicial
power was "vested" in the judicial branch." It asserted that "[n]ot
a fragment of [the judicial power] belongs to the legislature.
1
5
This pointed language could have suggested that the court would
strike down a law as unconstitutional if it in any way affected the
power of the judicial branch. However, the supreme court also
noted that "[t]he trial, conviction, and sentencing of criminals are
7. Id. at 494.
8. Id.
9. Id. Specifically, the court stated that "the judicial power of the Commonwealth is
its whole judicial power; and it is so distributed that the legislature cannot exercise any part
of it. Under the constitution, therefore, there is no mixed power-partly legislative and
partly judicial." Id.
10. Id. at 494-95.
11. Greenough, 11 Pa. at 495. The court also held that the Act of 1848 was unconsti-
tutional based on article IX, section 9 of the constitution, which the court said stated that
"no person shall be deprived of property except by the judgment of his peers or the law of
the land." Id.
12. 42 Pa. (6 Wright) 446 (1862).
13. Haloway, 42 Pa. at 448. The court quoted the following relevant portion of the
statute:
[E]very prisoner who shall have no infraction of rules recorded against him for any
month of the first year of his imprisonment-one day for the first month, two addi-
tional days for the second month, and three additional days of each succeeding
month for the first year's imprisonment-and to a similar deduction of four days for
each month of faultless conduct in the second year, and to one additional day per
month for each succeeding year.
Id. at 447-48.




judicial duties. . .. "" The supreme court, therefore, recognized
that certain duties were inherently part of the judicial branch and
the legislature could not properly engage in any of these duties. It
was reasonable to conclude that the court would only declare a law
unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine
if the legislature engaged in what was considered an exclusive judi-
cial function.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania took this approach in
Hoopes v. Bradshaw.17 In this case, the court suggested that there
were some areas in which the legislature could enact legislation
that affected the judicial branch. The court considered whether an
act by the legislature, which provided that admission to practice as
an attorney in the state supreme court operated as an admission to
practice law in every county of the commonwealth, was
unconstitutional.
18
The supreme court reiterated the principle that an inherent
power of one branch of the government could not be properly exer-
cised by another branch."' The court stressed that admission to
practice law was an inherent duty of the judicial branch. 0 How-
ever, Justice Brown, writing the opinion for the court, restated the
issue as being whether this legislative act was "an attempt by the
Legislature to usurp judicial power, or [whether] it in any manner
interfere[d] with the exercise of judicial functions[ ].,,21 The court
held that the act was not unconstitutional because it only stated
what effect was to be given to a purely judicial act.22 Thus, this act
did not interfere with a power that was exercised by only the
judiciary.2"
16. Id.
17. 80 A. 1098 (Pa. 1911). In Hoopes, the petitioner was a member of the bar of the
Allegheny County courts and the supreme court. Hoopes, 80 A. at 1099. The petitioner
sought to represent his client in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County. Id. However,
the prothonotary of Beaver County refused to issue an approval ,for the petitioner. Id. The
petitioner, therefore, sought a writ of mandamus directing the prothonotary to recognize
him as a member of the Beaver County bar. Id.
18. Id. at 1099.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1099-1100.
22. Hoopes, 80 A. at 1100.
23. Id. See In re Olmsted, 140 A. 634 (Pa. 1928). The supreme court in In re Olmsted
cited Hoopes and stated the rule of law in Pennsylvania to be as follows:
Statutes dealing with admissions to the bar will be judicially recognized as valid so
far as but no further than the legislation involved does not encroach on the right of
the courts to say who shall be privileged to practice before them and under what
circumstances persons shall be admitted to that privilege. Acts of this kind have been
542 Vol. 32:539
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The Hoopes decision reinforced the notion that the court was
basically concerned about preserving inherent powers of the judi-
cial branch from encroachment by the legislature. The court was
not declaring laws unconstitutional merely because they affected
aspects of the judicial branch. For example, in 1949 the court in
Leahey v. Farrel12 4 considered the issue of whether the regulation
of the compensation of court employees by the legislature was an
unconstitutional invasion of the powers of the judiciary. 5 Justice
Stearne, writing the opinion for the court, noted that the legisla-
ture may not encroach upon the judiciary in the administration of
justice.26 Justice Stearne noted that there were general areas where
the legislature could not act because those areas involved exclusive
judicial functions. For example, he indicated that the legislature
could not overrule a judicial decision, direct a statute to be con-
strued in a certain way, grant a new trial, or change the effect of
judgments or decrees previously rendered.2'8 The court, however,
stressed that with the separation of powers, one branch of govern-
ment may overlap with another. 9 Furthermore, the court sug-
construed in the past in such a way as to bring them within this rule, rather than as
being unconstitutional.
In re Olmsted, 140 A. at 636.
24. 66 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1949).
25. Leahey, 66 A.2d at 578. The court noted the following relevant portion of the
statute:
[S]alaries and compensation. . . shall be fixed by the salary board created by this act
• . . [t]he board shall . . . fix the compensation of all . . . court criers, tip-staves and
other court employes, and of all officers, clerks, stenographers, and employes ap-
pointed by the judge of any court and who are paid from the county treasurer.
Id.
In this case, the judges of the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County entered an
order to increase the compensation of court stenographers. Id. However, the county commis-
sioners and the county comptroller refused to recognize the pay increase because the judges
had failed to comply with the statute. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 579.
28. Id. See also, Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities v.
Scott, 29 A.2d 328 (Pa. 1942) (stating that under the separation of powers doctrine, the
legislature can not interfere with a judgment or decree of the judicial branch); In re East
Grant Street, In Lancaster, 16 A. 366 (Pa. 1888) (noting that the power to declare the
"meaning" of a statute was an inherent function of the judicial branch); Titusville Iron-
Works v. Keystone Oil Co., 15 A. 917 (Pa. 1888) (holding that the power to interpret a
statute was an inherent power of the judicial branch, and the legislature cannot constitu-
tionally direct the court to interpret a statute in a certain way); De Chastellux v. Fairchild,
15 Pa. (3 Harris) 18 (1850) (holding that the power to grant a new trial was a court power,
and therefore, cannot be constitutionally exercised by the legislature); and Greenough v.
Greenough, 11 Pa. (1 Jones) 489 (1849) (see notes 6-11 and accompanying text).
29. Leahey, 66 A.2d at 579.
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gested that it was necessary for each branch to cooperate in order
to have an efficient administration of justice.30
In the present case, the court held that this act did not unconsti-
tutionally infringe upon the powers of the judicial branch.31 The
court, however, noted that if an act of this type was arbitrary or
capricious in such a way that it would interfere with the adminis-
tration of justice, the court would consider it a violation of the sep-
aration of powers doctrine, and therefore, unconstitutional.3 2
THE 1968 AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE V
The supreme court through the 1960s and 1970s followed an in-
terpretation of the separation of powers doctrine which permitted
certain acts of the legislature to affect the judicial branch only if
the legislative act did not impair the administration of justice.
However, the most significant modification of the separation of
powers doctrine occurred in 1968. In that year, the ninety-four
year old state constitution was amended by a limited constitu-
tional convention. The section which the court previously relied on
for the separation of powers principle essentially remained un-
changed. 33 However, article V, section 10(a) was added granting to
the supreme court general supervisory and administrative author-
ity over the judicial branch. 3' Article V, section 10(c) was also
added, granting to the supreme court the power to enact rules gov-
erning all aspects of the judicial branch." Nonetheless, article V,
30. Id.
31. Leahey, 66 A.2d at 580.
32. Id. The court also emphasized that the fiscal power was vested in the legislature
by article IX of the constitution. Id. at 578.
33. Article V, section 1 was modified to read as follows:
The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial system
consisting- of the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court,
courts of common pleas, community courts, municipal and traffic courts in the City of
Philadelphia, such other courts as may be provided by law and justices of the peace.
All courts and justices of the peace and their jurisdiction shall be in this unified judi-
cial system.
PA. CONST. art. V, § 1.
34. Article V, section 10(a) provides that "[t]he Supreme Court shall exercise general
supervisory and administrative authority over all the court and justices of the peace, includ-
ing authority to temporarily assign judges and justices of the peace from one court or dis-
trict to another as it deems appropriate." PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(a).
35. Article V, section 10(c) provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules governing prac-
tice, procedure and the conduct of all courts, justices of the peace and all officers
serving process or enforcing orders, judgments or decrees of any court or justice of the
peace, including the power to provide for assignment and reassignment of classes of
Vol. 32:539
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section 10 (c) also contained language that limited the judicial
branch's rule making power. This language noted that any legisla-
tive law would be unconstitutional only if the statute was inconsis-
tent with a court rule or order.
The commonwealth court in Sweet v. Pennsylvania Labor Rela-
tions Board 6 noted no major change in its interpretation of the
separation of powers doctrine irrespective of the new language con-
tained in the constitution. In this case, the court considered a final
order of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board which concluded
that Washington County, acting through its county commissioners,
was the public employer of the court-related employees of that
county within the meaning of the Public Employee Relations Act. 7
Specifically, the court considered the issue of whether the act was
unconstitutional because it applied to court-related employees and
would affect such employees thereby constituting a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine.38 Judge Bowman, writing the major-
ity opinion, cited the Leahey case and stated that the act as ap-
plied to court-related employees did not interfere with the proper
functioning of the courts and the administration of justice as to
represent an unconstitutional legislative encroachment upon the
judicial branch. 9
In reaching this decision, the court cited article V, section 140
instead of article V, section 10.41 In dicta, however, the court noted
that the judicial branch was being unified under the general super-
visory and administrative authority of the supreme court, and
therefore, its holding in this case would soon be obsolete."2
actions or classes of appeals among the several courts as the needs of justice shall
require, and for admission to the bar and to practice law, and the administration of
all courts and supervision of all officers of the Judicial Branch, if such rules are con-
sistent with this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive
rights of any litigant, nor affect the right of the General Assembly to determine the
jurisdiction of any court or justice of the peace, nor suspend nor alter any statute of
limitation or repose. All laws shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsis-
tent with rules prescribed under these provisions.
PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c).
36. 316 A.2d 665 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974).
37. Sweet, 316 A.2d at 666-67.
38. Id. at 667.
39. Id. at 667-68.
40. See note 33 for the relevant text of article V, section 1.
41. Sweet, 316 A.2d at 667-68. See notes 34-35 for the relevant text of article V, sec-
tion 10.
42. Sweet, 316 A.2d at 669. Specifically the court stated:
[Als unification of judicial branch of government moves toward reality as mandated
by the Constitution and becomes in fact truly unified under the general supervisory
1994
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INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE V, SECTION 10
The first case that the state supreme court decided after the
1968 amendment was Commonwealth v. Sutley."s The court con-
sidered the issue of whether an amended act that mandated the
judicial branch to resentence criminals who had been convicted
under the prior act was unconstitutional.' Justice Nix, writing for
the majority of the court, held that this statute violated the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine because the legislature required the court
to open a final judgment based on the newly passed statute. 6
It was not unusual that the supreme court declared this law un-
constitutional. This case was very similar to the early cases of
Greenough and Halloway. In fact, the court conceded that it based
its decision on prior case law that interpreted the separation of
powers doctrine under the state constitution." Therefore, the
court did not rely on the newly amended article V, section 10 of
the constitution.
One of the first cases that interpreted article V, section 10 was
Ballou v. State Ethics Commission.47 In the instant case, the com-
monwealth court struck down a financial disclosure provision of an
ethics law as it applied to attorneys. The court based its decision
specifically on article V, section 10(c).
49
and administrative authority of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania [under] Article
V, Section 10, present concepts of the employer of court-related employees and the
criteria by which such a determination is made must be reconsidered and will be
reshaped and much we say today may be soon antiquated.
Id.
Judge Mencer filed a dissenting opinion with Judge Crumlish and Judge Kramer joining.
The dissent noted that if the public employer was the County of Washington as defined by
the act (a finding with which the dissent disagreed) then the act was unconstitutional. Id. at
672. (Mencer, J., dissenting). Judge Mencer asserted that this was an unconstitutional en-
croachment by the legislature upon the inherent powers of the judiciary. Id. The dissent
cited article V, but it failed to specify if this act was unconstitutional under section 1 or 10.
Id.
43. 378 A.2d 780 (Pa. 1977). In Sutley, two defendants were convicted in unrelated
prosecutions for possession of marijuana. Sutley, 378 A.2d at 781. Subsequently, the state
legislature passed a statute that called for the resentencing of certain defendants who had
been convicted of possession of marijuana. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 788.
46. Id. at 782-83. The court cited the Greenough case. Id. at 783.
47. 424 A.2d 983 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).
48. The Ethics Act required public officers and employees to annually file statements
of their financial interests. Ballou, 424 A.2d at 984. The petitioner in this case sought to
have the law declared unconstitutional because he was the solicitor of a county coroner, and
the supreme court had the only authority to require him to disclose information. Id.
49. Id. at 986.
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Furthermore, the majority opinion stated that "[w]hen the judi-
ciary Article of the Pennsylvania Constitution was revised in 1968,
the Supreme Court's inherent and exclusive power, until then im-
plicit as a fundamental matter, was made explicit by Article V Sec-
tion 10(c)." 50 The court suggested that this act would have been a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine even before the 1968
amendment. In fact, the court quoted the following supreme court
comment contained in Rule 103 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Dis-
ciplinary Enforcement: "'[t]he Supreme Court declares that it has
inherent and exclusive power to supervise the conduct of attorneys
who are its officers which power is reasserted in Section 10(c) of
Article V of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.' "51
Interestingly, the earlier cases did not assert such power, nor did
the preamended constitution grant the court this power. For exam-
ple, in the Hoopes and Leahey cases, in which legislative acts af-
fected both attorneys and court employees, the court did not strike
down the laws as an unconstitutional violation of the separation of
powers doctrine. Furthermore, the commonwealth court in Sweet
indicated that article V, section 10(c) had granted to the judiciary
more authority than it had before the 1968 amendments.5 3
Nonetheless, Judge Craig, in his dissenting opinion in Ballou,
noted that this law was not even a violation of the separation of
powers doctrine under section 10(c).53 He emphasized the following
language of section 10(c): "'[a]ll laws shall be suspended to the
extent that they are inconsistent with rules prescribed under these
provisions.'"" Judge Craig pointed out that this language permits
consistent laws to coexist with judicial rules.5 He asserted that
this law was not inconsistent with any judicial rule and suggested
that the majority had not recognized a portion of the
constitution."
50. Id.
51. Id. at 986 (quoting PA. R. Discip. ENF. 103) (emphasis added).
52. See note 42 and accompanying text.
53. Id. at 987 (Craig, J., dissenting).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. After Ballou, the commonwealth court followed the holding in several subse-
quent cases. For example, in Forney v. State Ethics Comm'n, 425 A.2d 66 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1981), the court held that the financial disclosure requirements as applied to a solicitor of a
board created by a municipality was unconstitutional because the supreme court has exclu-
sive power to regulate the conduct of attorneys.
In Beckert v. American Fed'n of State, County and Municipal Employees, 425 A.2d 859
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981), the court held that the discharge of a judicial employee was a judi-
cial power vested in the courts and may not be policed, encroached upon or diminished by
-1994
Duquesne Law Review
PENNSYLVANIA'S SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
The state supreme court has essentially adopted two approaches
when determining whether a legislative act violates the state con-
stitution under the separation of powers doctrine. First, the state
supreme court determines whether the law conflicts with any court
declared rule or decree. Second, the court considers whether the
statute in any way affects the judicial branch.
For example, in Commonwealth v. Sorrell57 the court considered
the issue of whether a statute that granted the commonwealth an
absolute right to a jury trial was unconstitutional. 58 The court
quoted both sections 10(a) and 10(c) of article V.59 The court em-
phasized that this statute conflicted with court sanctioned Rule of
Criminal Procedure 1101 which entrusted the decision to grant the
defendant a nonjury trial to the trial judge. 0
Because this law conflicted with a court rule, it would have been
unconstitutional under article V before it was amended in 1968.
Therefore, the decision in Sorrell was not inconsistent with prior
supreme court decisions that interpreted the separation of powers
doctrine.
The second approach in interpreting article V, section 10 of the
constitution clearly represents a break from the court's earlier in-
terpretation of separation of powers doctrine. For example, in
Kremer v. State Ethics Commission"1 the court addressed an issue
similar to that which the commonwealth court had addressed in
Ballou. Specifically, the issue was whether the financial disclosure
requirement under the Ethics Act was unconstitutional as it ap-
another branch of the government pursuant to the separation of powers doctrine.
Finally, in Kury v. Commonwealth State Ethics Comm'n, 435 A.2d 940 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1981), the court held that the portion of the Ethics Act that provided no former official or
public employee shall represent anyone before the governmental body with which he had
been associated for one year after he leaves that body was a violation of the separation of
powers doctrine.
57. 456 A.2d 1326 (Pa. 1982).
58. Sorrell, 456 A.2d at 1327. The relevant portion of the statute states that "[iun
criminal cases the Commonwealth shall have the same right to trial by jury as does the
accused." 45 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5104(c) (1981).
59. Sorrell, 456 A.2d at 1327-28.
60. Id. The relevant portion of Rule 1101 provides:
In all cases, the defendant may waive a jury trial with the consent of his attorney, if
any, and approval by a judge of the court in which the case is pending, and elect to be
tried by a judge without a jury. The judge shall ascertain from the defendant whether
this is knowing and intelligent waiver, and colloquy shall appear on the record.
Id. (quoting PA. R. CRIM. P. 1101).
61. 469 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1983).
Vol. 32:539
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plied to judges.62 The court, citing as authority sections 10(a) and
10(c) of article V, declared the financial disclosure provisions of
the Ethics Law unconstitutional because those provisions infringed
on the court's power to supervise the judicial branch. 3 The court
noted that it had established a judicial code that applied specifi-
cally to judges.64 However, the court ignored the fact that this law
did not conflict with any part of the judicial code. Justice Hutchin-
son in his dissent declared that "[t]he majority reasons fallaciously
when it assumes that everything which affects the judiciary uncon-
stitutionally interferes with [the judicial branch]. 65
Thus, the separation of powers doctrine in Pennsylvania has
evolved into a powerful check on legislative action. The doctrine
originally permitted legislative acts to affect the judicial branch as
long as these acts did not interfere with the administration of jus-
tice. Presently, however, the separation of powers doctrine is being
used to strike down laws that affect the judicial branch in any way.
MASSACHUSETTS' SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE: AN EXAMPLE
OF THE MAJORITY APPROACH
Pennsylvania represents the minority approach to the separation
of powers doctrine, while Massachusetts represents the majority
approach.66 Using Massachusetts as an example illustrates that the
judicial branch in the majority of states is not as powerful as it is
in Pennsylvania. In fact, the judicial branch in states like Massa-
chusetts usually defers to the other branches, particularly the leg-
islative branch, when there is no conflict between them.
The first primary case that considered the separation of powers
doctrine in Massachusetts was Collins v. Godfrey.6 7 The court as-
serted that article 30 of the state constitution provides expressly
for the separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers of
the government.6 8 This also included the exclusive exercise of judi-
62. Kremer, 469 A.2d at 595.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 595-96.
65. Id, at 596 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
66. See note 2 for other examples of the majority approach.
67. 87 N.E.2d 838 (Mass. 1949).
68. Collins, 87 N.E.2d at 839. Article 30 of the Massachusetts constitution provides:
In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never ex-
ercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of.them: the executive shall never
exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial branch shall
never exercise the legislative and executives powers, or either of them: to the end it
may be a government of laws and not of men.
1994 549
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cial powers by the judicial department of the government.69 The
court noted that it was settled law in the commonwealth that in
the distribution of powers, the ultimate power of general control
over the practice of law rested with the judicial branch.
70
This ultimate power with respect to the practice of law, however,
was not considered exclusive. The court noted that the legislature
could assist the judicial branch, and in fact, impose higher stan-
dards upon officers of the judicial branch. 71 However, if the judicial
branch established a higher code than the legislature, that code
would prevail.72
In following the constitutional principles established in Collins,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court decided Burnside v. Bristol
County Board of Retirement.7 The issue the court considered was
whether the legislature may remove a deputy sheriff from office
when the sheriff was required to attend sessions of court as part of
his employment. 4
The plaintiff argued that his removal from office was a judicial
act that could not be exercised by either the legislative or execu-
tive branches because it violated the separation of powers of the
state constitution. 75 The court agreed with the plaintiff that re-
moval of an officer of the court was a power incidental to the
court's judicial functions.7 However, the court disagreed with the
plaintiff's assertion that the legislature was precluded from estab-
lishing standards for the removal an officer of the court.7 The
court held that in this case the legislature properly removed the
plaintiff.
78
MASS. CONST. art. XXX, § 31.




73. 226 N.E.2d 234 (Mass. 1967). In this case, the plaintiff brought an action to en-
join the defendant from terminating the plaintiff's employment. Burnside, 226 N.E.2d at
235. The plaintiff was a deputy sheriff whose employment responsibilities included attend-
ing session of the supreme judicial court and superior court. Id. The defendant notified the
plaintiff that his employment would terminate on June 30, 1964 because the plaintiff would
be 70 years old on June 25, 1964. Id. at 236.
Compare Beckert v. American Fed'n of State County and Mun. Employees, 425 A.2d 859
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (See note 56 for a discussion of the Beckert case).
74. Burnside, 226 N.E.2d at 235.
75. Id. at 236.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. Compare Gardner v. Peoples, 506 A.2d 479 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (holding
that a law requiring the retirement at age 70 for all county employees was an unconstitu-
550 Vol. 32:539
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Citing the above-mentioned cases, the court in Opinion of The
Justices To The Senate7 9 answered questions submitted by the
Senate concerning an order that the Senate had adopted. 0 Specifi-
cally, the court answered questions about a law entitled "An Act to
Control Conflicts of Interest by Public Officials."8 " The law re-
quired certain state and county public officials and employees, in-
cluding candidates for elective and certain appointive state and
county offices, to disclose their financial interests publicly each
year.2 The law would be enforced by a five member state ethics
commission." One of the primary questions addressed by the court
was whether the law would violate the Massachusetts Constitution
because it imposed filing and other requirements on personnel in
the judicial department, although the law did not apply to
judges."
The court noted that the legislative and executive departments
were prohibited from exercising powers belonging to the judici-
ary. 5 The court asserted that this prohibition is part of the princi-
ple of separation of powers of article 30 of the state constitution. 6
The state supreme court, however, refused to interpret the consti-
tution's separation of powers doctrine as prohibiting the legislature
from enacting laws affecting the judicial branch. The court said
that "[w]hile we recognize the importance of observing scrupu-
lously the division of powers of each branch of government, we also
are cognizant of the need for some flexibility in the allocation of
functions among the three departments. 8 7 The court reasoned
that each branch of the government in some degree has executive,
legislative, and judicial functions. 8
The critical test for this court was whether the requirements this
law imposed on attorneys and other personnel of the judicial
branch would unconstitutionally interfere with the functions of the
judicial branch of government.8 9 The court held that there was
tional violation of the separation of powers doctrine as applied to judicial staff).
79. 376 N.E.2d 810 (Mass. 1978).




84. Id. at 821.
85. Opinion of The Justices, 376 N.E.2d at 821-22.






nothing in the law that would represent an unconstitutional inter-
ference by the legislative or executive branches of the government
into the powers of the judicial branch.90 The court reasoned that
even though it had the authority to establish standards of conduct
of personnel in the judicial branch, the legislature could establish
complementary standards."e With this power, the court also noted
that the legislature could establish a commission to enforce its law
if the commission were subject to judicial review.9 2 The Massachu-
setts Supreme Court limited the authority of the legislature, and
followed its earlier precedent, by stating that if the judicial depart-
ment issued a rule imposing higher standards or standards in con-
flict with any legislative act, the judicial rule must prevail.9 3
As in Pennsylvania, the separation of powers doctrine in the ma-
jority of states prohibits the legislature from enacting laws that
conflict with court orders or decrees or engage in an exclusive judi-
cial function. The courts under these circumstances are concerned
with legislative interference in the administration of justice. How-
ever, unlike the majority, Pennsylvania courts invoke the separa-
tion of powers doctrine to protect against any legislative action
that concerns the judicial branch.
CONCLUSION
Presently in Pennsylvania, forces are gathering to reform its
highest court. 4 Pennsylvania's supreme court seems to have
greater power than any other state supreme court in the country.
Most of this power is based upon article V, sections 10(a) and 10(c)
of the state constitution. In addition, due to the court's interpreta-
tion of these sections, the court possesses more authority than is
actually granted by the plain language of the constitution. Recent
90. Opinion of The Justices, 376 N.E.2d at 822.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. For example, the court noted that the law under discussion required attorneys
who were candidates or holders of public office to disclose the names, addresses and nature
of business of their clients. Id. at 822 n.15. It was possible, the court reasoned, that this
could conflict with the court-issued rule that forbids attorneys from revealing information
that would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to a client. Id. If this would
occur, the court-issued rule would prevail. Id.
Compare with Maunus v. State Ethics Comm'n, 544 A.2d 1324 (Pa. 1988) (holding that an
attorney representing a state agency was not subject to financial disclosure law); see also,
Ballou v. State Ethics Comm'n, 424 A.2d 983 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (see notes 47-56 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Ballou case).
94. See Dale Russakoff, Bar Group Looks Into Benching Pennsylvania Highest
Court, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1992, at A4.
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supreme court decisions have stated that the amended constitution
reasserted this power. It is not clear, however, where any of this
newly found power was first asserted.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has employed the separa-
tion of powers doctrine to declare acts by the legislature unconsti-
tutional even if the acts do not conflict with any judicial order. The
court is thereby applying the doctrine to acts to which it had his-
torically been inapplicable. As Justice Warren of the United States
Supreme Court once noted, "the 'separation of powers' doctrine
was obviously not instituted with the idea that it would promote
governmental efficiency. It was, on the contrary, looked to as a bul-
wark against tyranny." 5 Clearly, this doctrine in Pennsylvania is
being invoked to serve as much more than protection against
tyranny.
John M. Mulcahey
95. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965).
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